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NOT JUST FOR PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
APPLYING THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE
BEYOND ITS ORIGINS
Danielle Sawaya*
Most litigants, if given the chance, prefer to assert tort theories to
recover their economic losses, rather than rely on the remedies provided
under contract law. This is primarily because plaintiffs have the potential
to recover more damages under tort law than contract law. However, most
courts have adopted a doctrine known as the economic loss rule to bar
plaintiffs from asserting certain tort theories to recover for their economic
loss. Although the economic loss rule may seem like an easy way to
maintain the boundary between tort law and contract law, confusion
abounds when courts attempt to determine the proper contexts in which to
apply the doctrine.
In 2013, the Florida Supreme Court resurrected issues of the doctrine’s
proper scope when it rendered Tiara Condominium Ass‘n v. Marsh &
McLennan Cos., which restricted application of the doctrine to products
liability cases. Although the Florida Supreme Court has held that the
economic loss rule applies only when a defective product causes pecuniary
loss to the plaintiff, other jurisdictions adhere to a broader application of
the doctrine. In these jurisdictions, the doctrine serves a fundamental
purpose to protect the boundary line between tort law and contract law by
preventing parties who are in contractual privity from circumventing the
bargain that they made in their contract. This Note argues that the
economic loss rule is not just for products liability, but should be applied to
serve such a fundamental purpose, specifically where sophisticated parties
engage in arms-length transactions, bargaining for the allocation of risk
and economic loss in their contract.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose a contractor purchases a new truck for hauling equipment in his
construction business. One day when he was attempting to slow down for a
turn, he discovered that the brakes did not work. The vehicle overturned,
but luckily he was not injured. It took two weeks to fix the truck and cost
$5000. As a result of his inability to use the vehicle, the contractor‘s
business operations were disrupted, causing him to lose $9000 in profit. If
the contractor sues the manufacturer or distributor of his truck, may he
recover the cost of repair and his lost earnings?1
Assume a buyer purchases a laptop computer for use in her business.
The laptop is defective, malfunctions, and requires a week to be repaired.
As a result, the laptop purchaser loses business. In fact, she is able to prove
that the defective laptop caused her to lose $50,000 in profit. If the laptop
owner sues the laptop manufacturer, may she recover her lost profit?
Finally, suppose a fisherman purchases a motor and installs it in his boat
for his fishing business. The motor turns out to be defective and catches
fire. Fortunately, the fisherman was not injured. However, because of the
defective motor the fisherman was not able to fish during the peak of the
season and thus lost a substantial profit. If the fisherman sues the
manufacturer or distributor of the motor, may he recover for his economic
loss?
Courts usually answer each of the foregoing questions in the negative. 2
The reason courts generally will not allow the contractor, the laptop
purchaser, and the fisherman to recover for their economic losses is because
of a tort doctrine known as the economic loss rule.3 The economic loss rule
bars plaintiffs from recovering tort damages for their economic loss where
the plaintiff has not sustained personal injury or property damage. 4 The
genesis of the economic loss rule can be traced to California where the
state‘s highest court barred a plaintiff from recovering economic damages

1. The facts in this hypothetical are adapted from Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d
145 (Cal. 1965).
2. See, e.g., E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871
(1986) (noting that where only a product is injured the plaintiff‘s remedy lies in contract and
warranty law); Seely, 403 P.2d 145 (precluding the plaintiff from recovering damages for his
defective truck based on a strict products liability theory); Dobrovolny v. Ford Motor Co.,
793 N.W.2d 445 (Neb. 2011) (barring recovery based on a products liability theory where
the plaintiff‘s Ford pickup truck caught fire and burned, but did not cause physical injury or
damage to other property).
3. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 449 (2d ed. 2011).
4. See Seely, 403 P.2d at 151 (noting that a manufacturer‘s liability is limited to
instances where the plaintiff sustains physical injury and ―there is no recovery for economic
loss alone‖); see also 2 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, § 449.
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caused by a defective truck.5 Twenty-one years later, the U.S. Supreme
Court adopted the doctrine in an admiralty case involving a defective
product.6 Today, most jurisdictions have followed suit and apply the
doctrine to preclude plaintiffs from recovering tort damages for a defective
product, absent personal injury or property damage.7
Although the majority of jurisdictions apply the economic loss rule in the
context of products liability, confusion abounds with respect to the
doctrine‘s application outside the realm of products liability cases. 8 In fact,
the Florida Supreme Court, after expanding the doctrine beyond the
products liability context, returned the economic loss rule to its origins.9 In
Tiara Condominium Ass’n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos.,10 the Florida
Supreme Court stated that the expansion of the economic loss rule outside
of products liability had become ―unwise and unworkable in practice.‖11
However, as one of the dissenting opinions note, the majority‘s decision
failed to explain why the economic loss rule is appropriate in products
liability cases but is ―unworkable or unwise in [a] broader context.‖12
Tiara illustrates the principal issue surrounding the economic loss rule:
whether (and to what extent) the doctrine should apply outside of the
products liability context. Although there are many variations of the
economic loss rule, it is not the intent of this Note to explain application of
the doctrine in each and every context or in each and every jurisdiction.
Rather, this Note focuses on the doctrine‘s application in the State of
Florida and on the Florida Supreme Court‘s decision to limit the economic
loss rule to products liability cases. This Note contends that the doctrine is
not just for products liability, and such a bright-line approach undermines
the doctrine‘s fundamental purpose to protect the boundary line between
tort law and contract law. Instead, the Florida courts should return to
applying the doctrine in contractual privity contexts. This Note, however,
does not argue for application of the doctrine in every circumstance where
the parties are in contractual privity. Rather, this Note argues that the
economic loss rule should be applied in the specific context where
sophisticated parties to a contract have bargained (or could have bargained)
for the allocation of risk and economic loss in their contract, and it offers a
5. Seely, 403 P.2d at 151–52.
6. E. River, 476 U.S. at 871 (―[W]e adopt an approach similar to Seely and hold that a
manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a negligence or strict
products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.‖).
7. See id. at 868 (noting that the majority land-based approach ―precludes imposing tort
liability if a defective product causes purely monetary harm‖); Reeder R. Fox & Patrick J.
Loftus, Riding the Choppy Waters of East River: Economic Loss Doctrine Ten Years Later,
64 DEF. COUNS. J. 260, 261 (1997) (asserting that East River profoundly influenced the
adoption of the economic loss rule in a majority of jurisdictions); Vincent R. Johnson, The
Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 526
(2009) (stating that there is a ―high degree of agreement‖ that purely economic losses
resulting from a defective product are not recoverable under tort law).
8. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 526–28.
9. Tiara Condo. Ass‘n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 407 (Fla. 2013).
10. 110 So. 3d 399 (Fla. 2013).
11. Id. at 407.
12. Id. at 413 (Canady, J., dissenting).
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framework that entails absolute deference to contract. It is arguably in such
circumstances that the doctrine‘s purpose of maintaining the boundary line
between tort law and contract law is most validated.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the economic loss rule.
Specifically, it examines what the doctrine is, the types of losses that fall
within its purview, and the origin and development of the rule. Part II
examines the Florida courts‘ struggle to define the scope of the economic
loss rule and the Florida Supreme Court‘s decision to restrict application of
the doctrine exclusively to products liability cases. Finally, Part III argues
for a broader application of the doctrine, particularly where sophisticated
parties engage in arms-length transactions, bargaining for the allocation of
risk and economic loss in their contract. When such conditions are present,
the economic loss rule should be applied, unless the contract says
otherwise.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE:
FROM PRODUCTS LIABILITY TO CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY
The economic loss rule is a broad rule that is applied in several types of
cases. This part provides an overview of the economic loss rule by
discussing two particular situations where the doctrine is applied:
(1) products liability cases and (2) contractual privity cases.13 Part I.A
introduces the general concept of the economic loss rule and considers the
specific types of losses that fall within its purview. Part I.B surveys the
origin and development of the economic loss rule in American
jurisprudence. Lastly, Part I.C examines application of the doctrine in cases
where the parties to a contract are in contractual privity.
A. Understanding the Economic Loss Rule
and What Constitutes Economic Loss
This section explains the general concept of the economic loss rule. It
then discusses the types of losses that fall within the scope of the doctrine.
Next, it provides examples of what constitutes noneconomic loss, and thus
potentially recoverable under tort law. Finally, this section concludes by
discussing the benefits of suing under a tort theory rather than relying on
the remedies of contract law.
1. What Is the Economic Loss Rule?
In the most basic sense, the economic loss rule is a judicially created
doctrine that serves to prevent plaintiffs from recovering damages under tort
law (generally, strict liability claims and negligence claims)14 when the
13. For purposes of this Note, references to contractual privity cases include products
liability and non-products liability cases.
14. Johnson, supra note 7, at 528. Although the broad term ―tort law‖ is often used to
express the concept of the economic loss rule, it is important to note that the doctrine does
not bar recovery for pure economic loss for all torts. See id. at 529–34. There are exceptions
under tort law where the doctrine does not prevent plaintiffs from recovering damages for
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only harm suffered is pure economic loss.15 Several Florida courts have
observed, however, that the economic loss rule is ―stated with ease but
applied with great difficulty.‖16 To a large extent, the confusion and
difficulty surrounding the doctrine‘s application is due to the fact that the
economic loss rule is not a single rule.17 Rather, it is a general rule under
which several sub-rules or variations of the rule exist.18 This is because
economic losses arise from a variety of situations, requiring different
analyses.19
Before the Florida Supreme Court restricted application of the economic
loss rule exclusively to the products liability context,20 Florida courts
primarily applied the doctrine in two situations: products liability cases and
cases where contractual privity existed between the parties.21 Within the
context of products liability, the economic loss rule prohibits a plaintiff
from recovering damages in tort when a defective product causes purely
economic loss.22 In other words, a defendant‘s tort liability with respect to
a defective product is limited to instances where the plaintiff sustains
personal injury or property damage to property other than the product
itself.23 In a contractual context, a plaintiff who incurs purely economic
loss as a result of the defendant‘s breach of an express or implied
contractual duty is barred from recovering tort damages, absent an
independent tort duty.24 In other words, a plaintiff‘s tort action to recover

their pure economic loss (e.g., intentionally tortious conduct). Id. Such exceptions, however,
are beyond the scope of this Note.
15. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965) (stating that ―a
manufacturer‘s liability is limited to damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery
for economic loss alone‖); see also Johnson, supra note 7, at 525–26. For purposes of this
discussion, pure economic loss can be understood as financial costs to the plaintiff that do
not arise from personal injury to the plaintiff or damage to the plaintiff‘s property. See Ralph
C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic Loss from NonEconomic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2008).
16. See, e.g., Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 544 (Fla.
2004) (Cantero, J., concurring) (noting that such phrase has been cited in Delgado v. J.W.
Courtesy Pontiac GMC-Truck, Inc., 693 So. 2d 602, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997);
Sandarac Ass‘n v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, 1352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992)); see also Comptech Int‘l, Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd., 753 So. 2d 1219, 1224
(Fla. 1999) (noting that ―confusion . . . has abounded in this area of law‖).
17. See 3 DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 607 (2d ed. 2011). According to Dobbs,
references to ―the‖ economic loss rule are misleading because it implies that there is one
overarching rule that courts apply. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id. Although there are several variations of the economic loss rule, this Note
primarily focuses on the products liability and contractual privity forms of the rule. As such,
other variations of the doctrine are beyond the scope of this Note and will not be addressed.
20. Tiara Condo. Ass‘n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 407 (Fla. 2013)
(holding that ―the economic loss rule applies only in the products liability context‖).
21. Am. Aviation, 891 So. 2d at 534 (limiting the economic loss rule to ―circumstances
where the parties are either in contractual privity or the defendant is a manufacturer or
distributor of a product, and no established exception to the application of the rule applies‖).
22. Id. at 538–41.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 536–38. An example of a tort independent of the contract is fraud. Id. at 543
n.3.
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purely economic loss will be barred where the defendant has not committed
a breach apart from the breach of contract.25
2. What Qualifies As ―Economic Loss‖
for Purposes of the Economic Loss Rule?
Before exploring the development of the economic loss rule, it is
important to distinguish economic loss from noneconomic loss. The
distinction is important because the type of loss incurred dictates whether
the plaintiff will be able to recover damages based on a tort theory or a
breach of contract claim, if any.26
In the most general sense, economic losses are ―disappointed economic
expectations.‖27 In the context of products liability, economic loss may
include damages for inadequate value of a product, costs of repair and
replacement of the defective product, or consequential lost profits as a result
of a defective product.28 According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts on
products liability, if a defective product29 causes purely economic loss, a
plaintiff‘s claim for damages cannot be resolved through tort law but is
limited to the terms of the contract and the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC).30
The Restatement provides examples of what constitutes
economic loss, illustrated below.31
a. Harm Only to the Product Itself
One type of pure economic loss is when the product causes harm only to
itself.32 This type of harm comes in two forms.33 First, a product may be
defective causing a buyer to incur repair or replacement costs.34 Second, a

25. Id. at 536–37.
26. See Anzivino, supra note 15, at 1082. For a discussion of the advantages of suing on
a tort theory rather than on a breach of contract claim, see infra Part I.A.4.
27. Casa Clara Condo. Ass‘n v. Charley Toppino & Sons Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1246
(Fla. 1993) (quoting Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55,
58 (Va. 1988); Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc., 745 P.2d 1284 (Wash.
1987)).
28. Id. (quoting Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 917, 918 (1966)).
29. The Restatement defines a product as ―tangible personal property distributed
commercially for use or consumption.‖ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
§ 19(a) (1998). Other items, such as real estate, may also be considered a product when the
context of its use is analogous to the use of tangible personal property. Id. Services,
however, are not considered products. Id.
30. Id. § 21 cmt. a.
31. See infra notes 32–52 and accompanying text; see also Anzivino, supra note 15, at
1087–92.
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d.
33. Id.
34. Id. An example is the cost of repair of a truck after defective brakes caused the
vehicle to overturn. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 147–48 (Cal. 1965)
(reviewing plaintiff‘s action against a manufacturer and distributor for the cost of repair of
his truck in the amount of $5466.09 after defective brakes caused the vehicle to overturn).
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buyer may sustain consequential losses35 as a result of a defect in the
product.36 The Restatement provides an illustration of the latter form of
economic loss: ABC company sells a conveyer belt to XYZ automobile
company.37 After XYZ installs the conveyer belt in its engine assembly
line, a defect in the conveyer belt causes it to break.38 As a result, the
production lines shut down.39 XYZ loses valuable production time when
launching its best-selling new model.40 The trier of fact finds that the
shutdown of the production lines caused XYZ to lose the sales of the cars
that would have been produced.41 It also finds that XYZ lost the
opportunity to be the first to market the new model thereby losing millions
of dollars to its rival company which was able to introduce its new model a
week ahead of XYZ instead of a week behind it.42 According to the
Restatement, XYZ has suffered pure economic loss in the form of
consequential losses and cannot recover from ABC under a tort cause of
action.43
b. Harm As a Result of a Component Part of an Integrated System
Another type of pure economic loss that is not recoverable under tort law
is harm that results from a defective product that is a component part of an
integrated system that causes harm only to the integrated system.44 Such
harm is deemed to be damage to the product itself (and not damage to other
property for which tort remedies may be available).45 This is known as the
integrated system rule.46 Under this rule, when the defective product and
the system are considered to be an integrated whole and the harm caused by
the defective product is limited to the system itself, such harm will not be

35. For purposes of this discussion, consequential loss may be understood as indirect
financial loss as a result of the defective product. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d. Loss of profit is one example. See Anzivino, supra note 15, at
1088.
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d.
37. Id. § 21 cmt. d, illus. 3.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. A more difficult situation may arise where the defect in the product makes it
unreasonably dangerous, but the product does not cause harm to persons or property. Id. § 21
cmt. d. The Restatement acknowledges that a plausible argument may be made that products
that are dangerous, and not merely inoperable, should be subject to products liability law. Id.
Nevertheless, a majority of jurisdictions have held that the remedies under the UCC—repair
and replacement costs and consequential economic loss—are sufficient. Id.
44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e; Anzivino, supra
note 15, at 1088.
45. Anzivino, supra note 15, at 1088.
46. Id. The integrated system rule was applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in E. River
S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986). For a more detailed
discussion of the Court‘s application of the rule, see infra Part I.B.2.
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considered damage to other property.47 Rather, such harm is purely
economic loss and unrecoverable under tort law.48
An example of the integrated system rule can be seen in the
Restatement‘s illustration of the conveyer belt.49 The defective conveyer
belt is a component part of the assembly line.50 The damage to the
assembly line that caused XYZ‘s lost profits is considered damage to the
product itself, and so it may not be recovered under tort law.51 The
Restatement notes that rejecting the integrated system rule would result in a
finding of property damage in essentially every case in which a product
harms itself.52
c. Pure Economic Loss Caused by Economic Torts
Economic torts concern pure economic losses (i.e., financial losses that
do not result from personal injury or property damage) in which the
plaintiff maintains a legally recognized possessory or ownership interest.53
Dan Dobbs provides such an example where a defendant negligently blocks
access to a plaintiff‘s store, without actually harming the property itself.54
In this example, the plaintiff has suffered pure economic loss because the
only harm the plaintiff incurred was a loss of profit from the inability of
customers to access the store.55 This type of economic harm does not
provide the storeowner with a legally recognized interest.56 Thus, the
storeowner‘s claim for pure economic loss will be precluded under the
economic loss rule.57
3. Noneconomic Loss: The Economic Loss Rule Does Not Bar
Recovery for Economic Harm or ―Other Property Damage‖
Economic harm may be distinguished from stand-alone economic torts.58
Unlike stand-alone economic torts, economic harm can result from any type
of tort.59 For example, medical bills and loss of wages may occur because
of a tort that causes the plaintiff to suffer personal injury or even emotional
harm; and decreased property value and repair costs are economic harms
that may result from torts that cause physical damage to property.60
47. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e; Anzivino, supra
note 15, at 1088.
48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e; Anzivino, supra
note 15, at 1088.
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d, illus. 3.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Id. § 21 cmt. e.
53. See 3 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 17, § 605.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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However, each such instance of economic harm is not an economic tort;61
rather, the economic harm is a part of the damages resulting from a personal
injury or property tort.62 Such forms of economic harm do not fall within
the scope of the economic loss rule, and therefore, plaintiffs are not
precluded from recovering these damages.63
Another form of economic harm that does not fall within the purview of
the economic loss rule is when the harm caused by a defective product is to
―other property.‖64 A product that is unworkable or malfunctions due to a
defect and causes harm to surrounding property has caused ―other property
damage.‖65 For example, if a defective automobile blows up without
damaging any surrounding property or persons, the claim is subject to the
economic loss rule and leaves the owner to sue on the warranty or not at
all.66 However, if the defective automobile also blows up a neighboring
home, the home is considered ―other property‖ and not the product itself. 67
Thus, the homeowner may recover damages to the home based on a tort
claim.68
As previously discussed, when economic harm comes from ―other
property damage,‖ a plaintiff‘s claim ordinarily will not be barred by the
economic loss rule.69 This is because the damage to the surrounding
property extends beyond the product or its integrated system.70 The
Restatement illustrates this type of damage with a hypothetical.71 A
company has an assembly line at its plant.72 A defective steering
mechanism in the company‘s forklift causes the forklift to go out of control
and damage the assembly line.73 The damages stemming from the
defective forklift are considered to be ―other property damage‖ actionable
through tort theories.74 Because the defective steering mechanism caused
damage beyond the forklift to the assembly line, the integrated system rule
is not applicable.75 The damages are noneconomic losses and potentially
recoverable under tort theories.76

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id. (―Such a claim for pure economic loss will often be rejected under one of the
economic loss rules.‖).
64. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e (1998); 2 DOBBS ET
AL., supra note 3, § 449.
65. 2 DOBBS ET AL, supra note 3, § 449.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e, illus. 4 (1998).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. § 21 cmt. e.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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The Supreme Court considered the issue of what constitutes ―other
property‖ in Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.77 The case
involved a defective hydraulic system that caused the engine room in a
fishing vessel to flood, catch fire, and ultimately sink the boat.78 Saratoga
brought a products liability suit against the designer of the ship‘s hydraulic
system and the builder of the vessel.79 Saratoga had purchased the fishing
vessel from the initial owner who had added equipment to the ship after he
had purchased it.80 The Court concluded that the damage to the boat was
not recoverable because it constituted the product itself.81 The issue before
the Court was whether the added equipment was part of the boat (i.e., the
―product itself‖ in which case the plaintiff could not recover under a tort
theory for any loss) or whether it constituted ―other property‖ (in which
case the plaintiff could potentially recover).82 The Court held that the
subsequently added equipment qualified as ―other property,‖ and thus
recovery for the damage to the equipment was available.83
4. Why a Plaintiff May Prefer to Sue on a Tort Theory
Rather than Under a Contract
Generally, breach of contract claims result when a party violates the
terms of an agreement made with another party, whereas tort claims are
generally pursued where the plaintiff has incurred physical injury or
property damage.84 However, there are instances where a tort claim and a
contract claim can ensue from the same conduct.85 In such cases, plaintiffs
will often attempt to assert both contract and tort claims.86 Affording a
plaintiff a tort remedy, as opposed to a contract remedy, has certain

77. 520 U.S. 875 (1997); id. at 886 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―Not a single lower court
decision (other than the one under review) has addressed the precise question presented: the
status as ‗other property‘ of additions made by a prior purchaser who was a user.‖).
78. Id. at 877 (majority opinion).
79. Id.
80. Id. The equipment added by the initial owner after he purchased the fishing vessel
included a skiff, a fishing net, spare parts, and miscellaneous equipment. Id.
81. See id. (―In this case all agree that the ‗product itself‘ consists at least of a ship as
built and outfitted by its original manufacturer and sold to an initial user.‖).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 884–85.
84. See TODD SORENSEN ET AL., WHEN CAN A BREACH OF CONTRACT BE A TORT AND
WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?, A.B.A. CLE SEMINAR (Feb. 16–19, 2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2012_cccle
_materials/12_tort.authcheckdam.pdf.
85. R. Joseph Barton, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss
Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789,
1797 (2000).
86. See, e.g., AFM Corp. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 796 F.2d 1467, 1468 (11th Cir.
1986) (involving claims for negligence and breach of contract); Fla. Power & Light Co. v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 785 F.2d 952, 953 (11th Cir. 1986) (involving claims for
negligence and for breach of express warranties in the contract); Tiara Condo. Ass‘n v.
Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 401 (Fla. 2013) (reviewing on appeal the
plaintiff‘s breach of contract and negligence claims against an insurance broker).
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advantages.87 Casting a claim under tort law provides at least three
advantages over contract law.88
First, contract law generally limits a defendant‘s liability to damages that
are reasonably foreseeable as a result of the breach of contractual duties.89
On the other hand, tort law exposes defendants to liability for all damages
proximately caused by the defendant‘s tort.90 Thus, under a tort theory the
plaintiff may be able to recover more damages.91 For example, although
punitive damages are generally not available in contract law, they are
sometimes available in tort.92 Second, a plaintiff may be able to bring a tort
claim long after the statute of limitations has run on a plaintiff‘s contract
claim93 because the tort law statute of limitations usually begins to run only
after the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.94 Finally, the
standard of proof to recover tort damages is less rigorous than the standard
for contract claims.95
Given the advantages of tort law for plaintiffs, the economic loss rule
serves a fundamental purpose to prevent ―contract law [from drowning] in a
sea of tort.‖96 As discussed below, an important justification for the
economic loss rule is to prevent plaintiffs from using tort law to circumvent
the parties‘ bargain and allocation of duties and risks in their contract.97
B. The Origins of the Economic Loss Rule in American Jurisprudence
To understand how the economic loss rule is currently applied, it is
helpful to examine the origins and development of the doctrine in American

87. SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 84.
88. See infra notes 89–95 and accompanying text.
89. SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 84.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981) (―Punitive damages
are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also
a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.‖), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 901 (1979) (permitting plaintiffs to recover damages ―to punish wrongdoers and deter
wrongful conduct‖).
93. Typically, the statute of limitations for a contract claim begins to run at the time the
contract is breached, irrespective of whether the aggrieved party knew or should have known
of the breach. See U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (2012).
94. See David G. Owen, Special Defenses in Modern Products Liability Law, 70 MO. L.
REV. 1, 36 (2005) (noting that a majority of jurisdictions follow the discovery rule, which
provides that ―a cause of action accrues not when the plaintiff is injured but when the
plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should discover, pertinent facts
about the injury‖).
95. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (requiring ―as much certainty as
the nature of the tort and the circumstances permit‖), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 352 (―Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the
evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty.‖).
96. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986) (―It is
clear, however, that if this development were allowed to progress too far, contract law would
drown in a sea of tort.‖). See infra Part I.C. for a discussion of the boundary-line
justification of the economic loss rule.
97. See infra Part I.C.
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jurisprudence. This section examines the landmark decisions where the
doctrine originated.
1. The Economic Loss Rule Is Created from Products Liability
The economic loss rule originated in the 1965 California Supreme Court
products liability case Seely v. White Motor Co.98 The plaintiff purchased a
truck from the defendant for his heavy-duty hauling business.99 Upon
acquiring the truck, the plaintiff found that the vehicle bounced violently.100
Eleven months after purchasing the truck, the plaintiff was slowing down
for a turn when he discovered that the brakes did not work.101 The truck
overturned, but the plaintiff was not injured.102 Due to the inability to use
his truck, the plaintiff‘s business operations were disrupted, and as a result
he incurred a loss of profit.103 The plaintiff brought suit against the dealer
and the truck manufacturer asserting breach of express warranty and strict
products liability claims to recover economic loss for the repair of his truck
and his lost profits.104
The California Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff was entitled
to recover damages for lost profits and the plaintiff‘s purchase price of the
truck under breach of an express warranty.105 However, the court noted
that had the defendant not warranted the truck, the plaintiff would not have
been permitted to recover damages under the warranty.106 It is only the
defendant‘s agreement with the plaintiff that permitted recovery for
economic loss.107
Significantly, the court also stated that the plaintiff could not recover
damages for economic loss based on the strict products liability claim. 108
In doing so, the California Supreme Court explicitly rejected the New
Jersey Supreme Court‘s holding in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,109
which permitted a consumer to bring a strict products liability claim against
a manufacturer for a defective product, even though the plaintiff‘s only
damage was the product‘s loss of value.110 Therefore, the California
98. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
99. Id. at 147.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 147–48.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 148. The plaintiff was entitled to recover $9240.40 for lost profits and
$11,659.44 for the payments he made on the truck. Id. However, the plaintiff‘s claim to
recover the cost of repair was denied since the trial court found that the plaintiff had not
proved that the bouncing of the truck caused the accident. Id.
106. Id. at 150 (noting that the defendant ―is responsible for these losses only because it
warranted the truck to be ‗free from defects in material and workmanship under normal use
and service‘‖).
107. Id. at 151 (―Defendant is liable only because of its agreement as defined by its
continuing practice over eleven months. Without an agreement, defined by practice or
otherwise, defendant should not be liable for these commercial losses.‖).
108. Id.
109. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
110. Seely, 403 P.2d at 151.
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Supreme Court established the economic loss rule by barring the plaintiff‘s
claim of strict products liability to recover purely economic loss caused by
a defective product.111
2. The U.S. Supreme Court Adopts the Economic Loss Rule
The economic loss rule gained widespread acceptance when, twenty-one
years after Seely, the Supreme Court decided East River Steamship Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval Inc.112 The Court applied admiralty law to hold that
―whether stated in negligence or strict liability, no products-liability claim
lies in admiralty when the only injury claimed is economic loss.‖ 113 The
case arose after a shipbuilder contracted with Transamerica Delaval to
design, manufacture, and install turbines that would serve as the propulsion
units for four oil-transporting supertankers.114 The plaintiffs then chartered
the supertankers.115 After being put into service, the turbines on each of the
supertankers malfunctioned due to design and manufacturing defects.116
Purely economic loss resulted since only the products themselves were
damaged.117 The plaintiffs filed suit based on a tort theory for products
liability and sought damages for the cost of repair of the supertankers and
the income lost when the ships were out of service.118
The Court focused on whether the plaintiffs could bring a claim based on
a tort cause of action when a defective product purchased in a commercial
transaction causes purely economic loss or whether such injury is the type
of harm that should be remedied under contract law.119 The Court adopted
an approach similar to Seely and held that ―a manufacturer in a commercial
relationship has no duty under either a negligence or strict products-liability
theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.‖120 The Court noted that
contract law, specifically the law of warranty, is the appropriate remedy to
resolve this type of commercial controversy because the parties may
bargain for the terms they agree to include in their contract.121 In addition,
a manufacturer may limit its liability by disclaiming warranties or
restricting remedies.122 The Court expressed concern that ―contract law
would drown in a sea of tort‖ if such claims were permitted to be brought
under products liability theories instead of the law of warranty.123
111. See id. (―Even in actions for negligence, a manufacturer‘s liability is limited to
damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery for economic loss alone.‖).
112. 476 U.S. 858 (1986); Fox & Loftus, supra note 7, at 261.
113. E. River, 476 U.S. at 876.
114. Id. at 859.
115. Id. at 859–60.
116. Id. at 860–61.
117. Id. at 861.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 859. (―[C]harting a course between products liability and contract law, we
must determine whether injury to a product itself is the kind of harm that should be protected
by products liability or left entirely to the law of contracts.‖).
120. Id. at 871.
121. Id. at 872–73.
122. Id. at 873.
123. Id. at 866.
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Therefore, the Court prohibited the plaintiffs‘ claims to recover purely
economic loss based on the tort theory of products liability.124
C. The Role of Contracts in Applying the Economic Loss Rule
For purposes of this Note, application of the economic loss rule entails
two inquiries: (1) whether a plaintiff may recover purely economic losses
caused by a defective product under a tort cause of action; and (2) whether a
plaintiff may recover purely economic losses based on a tort theory when
the parties bargain for the allocation of economic loss in their contract. As
previously discussed, a majority of jurisdictions answer the first inquiry in
the negative, absent any physical injury or property damage.125 This
section, therefore, focuses on the second inquiry concerning the role of
contracts in applying the economic loss rule. First, it examines a principal
justification for why the economic loss rule is used in the contractual privity
context. Then, it discusses the consequences of failing to adhere to that
principal justification. Finally, it provides a brief introduction to the
independent duty rule.
1. The Boundary-Line Justification: Protecting the Boundary Line
Between the Law of Torts and the Law of Contracts
A principal justification for the economic loss rule is to protect the
boundary line between tort law and contract law.126 This is known as the
boundary-line justification.127 According to this rationale, the underlying
purpose of the economic loss rule is to maintain and enforce the
―fundamental boundaries of tort and contract law‖ in circumstances where
both tort and contract theories are implicated.128
The boundary-line justification can be clearly seen in the products
liability context.129 When a product injures only itself, it is understood as a
warranty claim because such harm simply means that the product has failed
to meet the consumer‘s expectations.130 The quality and value of the

124. Id. at 876.
125. See id. at 868 (noting that Seely established the economic loss rule in products
liability which is the approach followed by a majority of jurisdictions); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d (1998); Johnson, supra note 7, at
526.
126. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965) (―The distinction that
the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for
economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the ‗luck‘ of one plaintiff in having an
accident causing physical injury.‖); Johnson, supra note 7, at 546.
127. Johnson, supra note 7, at 546.
128. E. River, 476 U.S. at 871 (―When a product injures only itself the reasons for
imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its contractual remedies are
strong.‖); Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864, 867 (Wash. 2007) (―The economic loss rule
applies to hold parties to their contract remedies when a loss potentially implicates both tort
and contract relief.‖); Johnson, supra note 7, at 546.
129. Johnson, supra note 7, at 549.
130. E. River, 476 U.S. at 872.
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product is ―precisely the purpose of express and implied warranties.‖131
Therefore, a claim to recover economic harm from a defective product
should be brought as a breach of warranty action.132 These types of claims
for economic harm are outside the realm of tort law because tort law,
particularly strict products liability, is concerned with deterring
manufacturers from making dangerous products that actually cause physical
injury or property damage.133 On the other hand, contract law is concerned
with holding parties to their terms and remedying purely economic loss.134
The economic loss rule can be said to maintain the boundary that separates
tort law from contract law by precluding plaintiffs from advancing tort135
theories to recover damages for economic loss alone.136 Instead, the
plaintiff must recover his or her economic loss through contract remedies, if
any.137
Although the boundary-line justification is well established in the
products liability context, the rationale is also pertinent in non-products
liability cases, especially between commercial parties who bargain for the
allocation of duties and risks in their contract.138 Such a situation arose in
Grynberg v. Agri Tech, Inc.139 The Grynbergs invested approximately $95
million for 135,000 cattle, which they entrusted to Agri Tech to care for and
feed.140 The agreement provided that Agri Tech would ―accept and care for
cattle belonging to [the Grynbergs] in accordance with the customary
standards of care, responsibility, and good animal husbandry.‖141 The
Grynbergs became dissatisfied with their investment returns, and sued Agri

131. Id.; U.C.C. § 2-313 (2012) (express warranty); id. § 2-314 (implied warranty of
merchantability); id. § 2-315 (warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
132. E. River, 476 U.S. at 872.
133. See id. at 870 (―[S]ince by definition no person or other property is damaged, the
resulting loss is purely economic. Even when the harm to the product itself occurs through
an abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value, and lost
profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain—
traditionally the core concern of contract law.‖); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODS. LIAB. § 1 cmt. d (1998).
134. E. River, 476 U.S. at 872–73 (―Contract law, and the law of warranty in particular, is
well suited to commercial controversies of the sort involved in this case because the parties
may set the terms of their own agreements.‖).
135. The broad term ―tort‖ is used to show that generally a principal justification behind
the economic loss rule is to protect the boundary-line between tort law and contract law. See
Johnson, supra note 7, at 546. However, many jurisdictions recognize exceptions for torts
such as fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and defamation, which are primarily about
economic harm. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 529–34.
136. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. a (―[P]roducts liability
law lies at the boundary between tort and contract. Some categories of loss, including those
often referred to as ‗pure economic loss,‘ are more appropriately assigned to contract law
and the remedies set forth in Articles 2 and 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code.‖);
Johnson, supra note 7, at 546–47.
137. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 546–49.
138. See generally Grynberg v. Agri Tech, Inc., 10 P.3d 1267 (Colo. 2000); see also
Johnson, supra note 7, at 546–49.
139. 10 P.3d 1267 (Colo. 2000); see SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 84.
140. Grynberg, 10 P.3d at 1268.
141. Id.
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Tech based on, among other claims, negligence and breach of contract.142
At trial, the jury found for the Grynbergs on their negligence claim but
found in favor of Agri Tech on the contract claim.143 On appeal, however,
the Colorado Supreme Court held that the economic loss rule barred the
Grynbergs from recovering on their negligence claim: ―This is a classic
example of a case where the plaintiffs are seeking to recover damages for
the loss of their bargain with defendants . . . . An action to recover damages
for the loss of a bargain is the exclusive province of contract law.‖144 Thus,
where a breaching party fails to perform under the agreed upon terms of the
contract and causes the aggrieved party to assert causes of action in tort and
contract based on the same governing facts, the economic loss rule is
generally applied to bar the tort claim and protect the bargain made between
the contracting parties.145
As exemplified by Grynberg, the boundary-line justification is especially
relevant where the parties are in contractual privity and have bargained for
specific terms in their contract.146 In such circumstances, economic loss
should be remedied under contract law, not tort law, because parties having
negotiated for specific terms generally should be held to their bargain.147
Parties to a contract have the opportunity to bargain for the allocation of
risk by imposing obligations on one another and setting their own terms. 148
Restricting recovery for economic loss to those within the contemplation of
the parties encourages parties to confidently allocate the risks of economic
losses during the bargaining process without fear that their negotiations will
be negated.149 Therefore, a party who wishes to be remedied if they incur
economic harm must bargain for it.150 Some courts have even stated that it
is not necessary for a risk of economic loss to be expressly represented in a
contract before a tort claim to recover that loss will be barred under the
economic loss rule.151 It is enough that the parties could have accounted for
142. Id. at 1268–69.
143. Id. at 1269.
144. Id. at 1270.
145. See id.; see also SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 84.
146. See Grynberg, 10 P.3d at 1267; see also Craig K. Lawler, Independent Duties and
Colorado’s Economic Loss Rule—Part I, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2006, at 23 (―At the heart of the
economic loss rule is the model of ‗perfect bargaining‘: two sophisticated parties bargaining
at arm‘s length to allocate risk and loss in contract. When these conditions are present,
Colorado courts give priority to the contract-based policies of the economic loss rule and
therefore hold parties exclusively to contract remedies.‖).
147. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 546–47.
148. See Detroit Edison Co. v. NABCO, Inc., 35 F.3d 236, 239 (6th Cir. 1994) (―The
essence of contract law is the bargain: parties of equivalent bargaining power negotiate the
terms of the transaction and each is then entitled to the benefit of the bargain.‖); Johnson,
supra note 7, at 546–47.
149. See Vanderbeek v. Vernon Corp., 50 P.3d 866, 871 (Colo. 2002) (―[P]arties must be
able to confidently allocate risks and costs during their bargaining without fear that
unanticipated liability may arise in the future, effectively negating the parties‘ efforts to
build these cost considerations into the contract.‖).
150. Johnson, supra note 7, at 547.
151. See e.g., Springfield Hydroelectric Co. v. Copp, 779 A.2d 67, 70 (Vt. 2001)
(―Contract principles, on the other hand, are generally more appropriate for determining
claims for consequential damages that the parties have, or could have, addressed in their
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the risk of such loss.152 As such, courts have applied the economic loss rule
to preclude plaintiffs who had the opportunity to bargain for the allocation
of risk of economic harm from asserting tort theories to recover for their
economic loss.153
2. Failing to Protect the Boundary Line: Drowning in a Sea of Tort
Several courts have recognized the consequences of not policing the
boundary line between tort law and contract law.154 Allowing tort and
contract remedies to overlap would cause ―certainty and predictability in
allocating risk [to] decrease and impede future business activity.‖155
Furthermore, permitting tort liability to expand to include purely economic
damages would cause parties to be exposed to ―liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.‖156 The
Supreme Court has even asserted that ―if this development were allowed to
progress too far, contract law would drown in a sea of tort.‖157
3. Independent Duties Separate and Apart from the Contract
In articulating the economic loss rule, some courts have focused on the
source of the duty allegedly violated.158 These courts hold that the
economic loss rule does not apply to bar tort claims for economic harm if
the defendant breached a duty that was independent of the contract.159 For
example, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has stated: ―[T]he question
agreement.‖ (quoting Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 672 (N.J.
1985))); Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864, 866 (Wash. 2007) (―There is no requirement that a
risk of loss must be expressly allocated in a contract before a tort claim based on that loss
will be precluded under the economic loss rule.‖); see also 3 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 17,
§ 515 (―Some courts have gone much, much further, refusing to entertain tort claims when
the plaintiff could have but did not actually contract about a matter.‖).
152. Springfield Hydroelectric, 779 A.2d at 70; Alejandre, 153 P.3d at 866; 3 DOBBS ET
AL., supra note 17, § 515.
153. Springfield Hydroelectric, 779 A.2d at 70; Alejandre, 153 P.3d at 866; 3 DOBBS ET
AL., supra note 17, § 515.
154. See infra notes 155–57 and accompanying text.
155. Alejandre, 153 P.3d at 868.
156. Id. at 868 (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931)); see
also E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 874 (1986)
(―Permitting recovery for all foreseeable claims for purely economic loss could make a
manufacturer liable for vast sums. It would be difficult for a manufacturer to take into
account the expectations of persons downstream who may encounter its product. In this
case, for example, if the charterers—already one step removed from the transaction—were
permitted to recover their economic losses, then the companies that subchartered the ships
might claim their economic losses from the delays, and the charterers‘ customers also might
claim their economic losses, and so on.‖).
157. E. River, 476 U.S. at 866.
158. Johnson, supra note 7, at 566; see infra notes 160–74 and accompanying text.
159. A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass‘n, 114 P.3d 862, 866 (Colo.
2005); Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 463
S.E.2d 85, 88 (S.C. 1995) (―In most instances, a negligence action will not lie when the
parties are in privity of contract. When, however, there is a special relationship between the
alleged tortfeasor and the injured party not arising in contract, the breach of that duty of care
will support a tort action.‖).
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of whether the plaintiff may maintain an action in tort for purely economic
loss turns on the determination of the source of the duty plaintiff claims the
defendant owed.‖160 If a breach of duty arises under a contract between the
parties, any action to recover economic harm must be remedied under
contract, not tort law.161 However, where the breach of duty arises
independently of any contract duties between the parties, an action may be
brought in tort law.162
The Colorado Supreme Court has also adopted a similar approach to
applying the economic loss rule: ―Where there exists a duty of care
independent of any contractual obligations, the economic loss rule has no
application and does not bar a plaintiff‘s tort claim because the claim is
based on a recognized independent duty of care and thus falls outside the
scope of the [doctrine].‖163 In other words, the economic loss rule is
applied if the only breach is a breach of contractual duty;164 however,
where the breach arises independently of any contractual duty between the
parties, the economic loss rule is not applied.165
An independent duty of care may occur when the duty did not arise out
of the contract and is not intertwined with a contractual duty of
performance.166 For the tort duty to be actionable, it therefore must be
separate from the contract.167 A professional malpractice claim is an
example.168 In such a case, a contract creates a special relationship between
the parties and the duties arising from the relationship may be enforced in
tort.169
Florida courts had also followed a contractual privity form of the
economic loss rule before the state‘s highest court rendered its decision in
Tiara and held that the economic loss rule applied exclusively in the
products liability context.170 In determining whether a duty is independent
of the contract, the Florida courts generally turned to the terms of the
contract bargained for by the parties.171 If the express terms of the contract
(and in some Florida jurisdictions the opportunity to bargain for terms),
addressed or incorporated a certain duty, it arguably was not
independent.172 However, if the plaintiff could show that the defendant
owed a duty separate from the contract that as a matter of public policy

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
2013).
171.
172.

Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing, 463 S.E.2d at 88.
Id.
Id.
A.C. Excavating, 114 P.3d at 866.
See id.
See id.
See 3 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 17, § 652.
See id.
See id. § 653.
Id. §§ 652–53.
Tiara Condo. Ass‘n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 402–04 (Fla.
See id.
See id.
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cannot be contracted away, then the plaintiff may have had a cause of action
based in tort law.173
II. EXPAND OR CONTRACT?: FLORIDA STRUGGLES
TO DEFINE THE LIMIT OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE
As Part I discussed, the economic loss rule is a broad rule under which
various applications exist. This part examines the various applications of
the doctrine in Florida case law, Florida‘s expansion of the rule beyond the
realm of products liability, and the Florida Supreme Court‘s concern of an
expansive doctrine, ultimately prompting the court to contract the
application of the rule exclusively to products liability. Part II.A discusses
the development and expansion of the economic loss rule in Florida case
law prior to Tiara. Part II.B examines the Florida Supreme Court‘s concern
with an expansive doctrine. Finally, Part II.C. looks at Tiara, which
restricts application of the doctrine based solely on whether the case
involves a defective product.
A. The Development and Expansion of the Economic Loss Rule in Florida
This section focuses on the adoption, development, and expansion of the
economic loss rule in the State of Florida. To understand Florida‘s decision
to roll back the economic loss rule exclusively in the products liability
context, it is helpful to trace Florida‘s development of the doctrine before
the state‘s highest court rendered its decision in Tiara. First, this section
discusses Florida‘s adoption of the economic loss rule in products liability.
Second, it examines the expansion of Florida‘s application of the doctrine
in non-products liability, specifically in the context of services. Lastly, it
looks at how contractual privity affected the state‘s application of the
doctrine.
1. Florida Establishes the Economic Loss Rule in Products Liability
The Florida Supreme Court adopted its initial version of the economic
loss rule in the seminal case of Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.174 Florida Power & Light contracted with Westinghouse to
173. See id.
174. 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987). Although the Florida Supreme Court did not
specifically address the economic loss rule until 1987, some Florida district courts of appeal
were already employing the doctrine to preclude recovery for pure economic loss in products
liability cases. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Zack Co., 445 So. 2d 350, 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (holding in a defective products case that ―the law of torts affords no cause of action
for the plaintiff . . . to recover for its purely economic losses in this case‖); Cedars of Leb.
Hosp. Corp. v. European X-Ray Distribs. of Am., Inc., 444 So. 2d 1068, 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (precluding a hospital‘s claim for strict products liability to recover its economic
loss caused by defective x-ray equipment); Monsanto Agric. Prods. Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So.
2d 574, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (prohibiting plaintiff from bringing a negligence
claim when herbicides failed to perform as expected and stating that tort law does not
recognize a duty to manufacture only products that meet the economic expectations of
consumers, but recognizing such duty under contract law where the manufacturer assumes
the duty as part of his bargain with the purchaser).
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purchase two nuclear steam supply systems, including six steam
generators.175 After allegedly discovering leaks in the six steam generators,
Florida Power & Light sued Westinghouse, claiming that Westinghouse
was liable for negligence and breach of express warranties in the
contract.176 Florida Power & Light sought damages for, among other
things, the cost of repair and inspection of the steam generators.177
The Southern District of Florida denied Westinghouse‘s motion for
partial summary judgment on the breach of warranty claim.178 However,
the trial court granted Westinghouse‘s motion for partial summary
judgment on the negligence claim, concluding that Florida law bars
recovery of economic loss without any claim of personal injury or other
property damage.179
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified two questions to the Florida
Supreme Court:
(1) Whether Florida law permits a buyer under a contract for goods to
recover economic losses in tort without a claim for personal injury or
property damage to property other than the allegedly defective goods.
(2) If Florida law precludes recovery for economic loss in tort without
a claim for personal injury or property damage to other property, whether
this rule should be applied retroactively in this case.180

The Florida Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative.181
It relied primarily on East River, Seely, and three Florida district court of
appeal cases182 to hold that contract principles are better suited than tort
principles to remedy purely economic loss.183 Thus, the court, quoting the
reasoning in Seely, agreed with Westinghouse that the majority approach in
the United States bars recovery of economic damages based on a tort cause
of action where there is no property damage or personal injury.184
Furthermore, the court reiterated the proposition in East River that in a
commercial relationship, ―a manufacturer . . . has no duty under either a
negligence or strict products liability theory to prevent a product from
injuring itself.‖185 The court concluded that economic risks, such as
product value and quality, should be negotiated between parties to a

175. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 785 F.2d 952, 953 (11th
Cir. 1986).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla.
1987).
182. See supra note 174.
183. Westinghouse, 510 So. 2d at 902.
184. Id. at 900–02.
185. Id. at 901 (quoting E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
871 (1986)).
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contract.186 Thus, warranty law should control any claims for purely
economic loss asserted by a party to a contract.187
In answering the second question (whether the economic loss rule should
be applied retroactively in the instant case), the court stated that the
economic loss rule ―is not a new principle of law in Florida.‖188 Rather,
―the economic loss rule has a long, historic basis originating with the privity
doctrine, which precluded recovery of economic losses outside a contractual
setting.‖189 Therefore, the court held that the economic loss rule should be
applied to the instant case not retroactively, but as a matter of existing
law.190
2. Florida Expands the Scope of the Economic Loss Rule
to Non-Products Liability
Three months after the Florida Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Westinghouse, the court decided AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co.,191 where it applied the economic loss rule to preclude a
purchaser of services from recovering economic loss in negligence.192
AFM contracted with Southern Bell for advertising services in the yellow
pages.193 At the time of the contract, AFM was considering moving its
office.194 However, such a move would cause significantly higher toll
charges.195 As a result, Southern Bell agreed that if AFM moved and
changed its phone number, it would provide a referral service to avoid the
higher toll charges.196 Thus, in the event callers telephoned AFM‘s old
number, they would be referred to their new number by a taped voice.197
The problem began when the yellow pages were distributed with AFM‘s
old number.198 Furthermore, Southern Bell issued AFM‘s old number to
another customer, which caused a disconnection with the referral service.199

186. Id. The parties to the contract were commercial entities engaged in a large
commercial transaction. Id. at 902. It is unclear whether the court‘s holding would have
been different had one party to the contract been a consumer. Nevertheless, such inquiry is
beyond the scope of this Note, as this Note argues for application of the economic loss rule
in a context similar to Westinghouse.
187. Id. at 901.
188. Id. at 902. Although not explicitly stated, the court seems to be referencing the three
decisions of the district courts of appeal. However, this case is the first time that Florida‘s
highest court articulated its adoption of the economic loss rule. See supra note 174 and
accompanying text.
189. Westinghouse, 510 So. 2d at 902.
190. See id.
191. 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
192. Id. at 181–82.
193. AFM Corp. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 796 F.2d 1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1986).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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The connection to the referral service was eventually reestablished;
however, it was later mistakenly disconnected a second time.200
AFM filed suit against Southern Bell based on negligence and breach of
contract and sought damages for its purely economic losses.201 At the trial,
AFM offered evidence that the referral service Southern Bell had agreed to
provide had been prematurely disconnected.202 AFM also produced expert
testimony that showed it lost $21,800 in profits because of Southern Bell‘s
failure to properly maintain the referral service.203 After AFM had
introduced all of its evidence, AFM‘s counsel decided to withdraw all of the
contract claims and proceed only on its negligence claim.204
The jury returned a verdict for AFM, awarding the company both
compensatory and punitive damages.205 Southern Bell appealed after the
trial court denied its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
in the alternative a motion for a new trial.206
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified three questions207 to the Florida
Supreme Court, which consolidated the questions into one: ―Does Florida
permit a purchaser of services to recover economic losses in tort without a
claim for personal injury or property damage?‖208 The court answered the
question in the negative, thereby expanding its holding in Westinghouse to
include services.209
In reaching its decision, the court noted the obvious distinction between
Westinghouse, where the court responded to a certified question concerning
the purchase of goods, and the instant case, which involved the purchase of
services.210 The court also emphasized that the contract between AFM and
Southern Bell ―defined the limitation of liability through bargaining, risk
acceptance, and compensation.‖211 Therefore, the court stated that there
must be a tort independent of the breach of contract to recover in

200. Id.
201. Id. AFM initially filed its lawsuit against Southern Bell in a Florida state court,
asserting claims for both negligence and breach of contract. Id. The case was later removed
to the Southern District of Florida. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. The three questions certified by the Eleventh Circuit were:
(1) Can a plaintiff suing exclusively in tort recover lost profits?
If the answer to question 1 is yes,
(2) Can negligent or willful breach of contract alone
constitute an independent tort?
If the answer to question 2 is yes,
(3) Can such a tort be the basis of an award of punitive damages if the other
criteria for awarding punitive damages are met?
Id. at 1469.
208. AFM Corp. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 180 (Fla. 1987).
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. Id. at 181.
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negligence.212 AFM failed to prove that its negligence claim was distinct
from the breach of contract.213 Therefore, the court concluded ―that
without some conduct resulting in personal injury or property damage, there
can be no independent tort flowing from a contractual breach which would
justify a tort claim solely for economic losses.‖214
In rendering its decision, the court addressed a seeming inconsistency
with its holding in a prior case, A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham.215 In Moyer,
the court allowed the plaintiff to recover purely economic losses based on a
negligence theory even though the plaintiff did not suffer any personal
injury or property damage.216 The court, however, did not overrule Moyer,
but distinguished the case by asserting that the Moyer plaintiff was not a
party to or third-party beneficiary of the contract with the defendant.217
Thus, since the plaintiff in Moyer did not have a contract under which he
could recover his loss, unlike the plaintiff in AFM, the court permitted
recovery for economic losses.218
Westinghouse, AFM, and Moyer seemed to suggest that the economic
loss rule applied where the parties were in contractual privity, allowing the
parties to negotiate and allocate risks.219 However, six years later the
Florida Supreme Court held that the economic loss rule applied regardless
of whether the parties are in contractual privity in Casa Clara
Condominium Ass’n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.220
3. Florida Applies the Economic Loss Rule
Regardless of Contractual Privity
After expanding the economic loss rule to cover services in AFM, the
Florida Supreme Court established that the doctrine would apply
irrespective of whether the parties were in contractual privity.221 In Casa
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 181–82.
215. 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973). In Moyer, the Florida Supreme Court answered the
certified question of whether a general contractor could sue a supervising architect or
engineer for negligent preparation of plans when the architect or engineer was not in direct
privity with the general contractor. Id. at 398.
216. AFM, 515 So. 2d at 181.
217. Id.
218. Id. In addition, to the lack of a contract under which the general contractor could
recover, pivotal to the court‘s decision was the supervisory nature of the relationship
between the architect and the general contractor. Id. As the court stated:
We based our decision on the fact that the supervisory responsibilities vested in the
architect carried with it a concurrent duty not to injure foreseeable parties not
beneficiaries of the contract. We declined in that case to find a basis for the
negligence claim under the contract itself, absent a clear intent manifested in the
contract. Since there was no contract under which the general contractor could
recover his loss, we concluded he did have a cause of action in tort.
Id.
219. See id. at 181; Fla. Power & Light v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 510 So. 2d 899
(Fla. 1987).
220. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993).
221. See id. at 1248.
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Clara, the court was presented with the issue of whether homeowners could
recover for purely economic losses from a concrete supplier based on a
negligence theory.222 The homeowners owned condominium units and
small homes that were built using concrete supplied by Charley Toppino &
Sons, Inc.223 The homeowners alleged that the concrete was defective and
as a result had damaged their homes.224 They brought suit against Toppino
for breach of implied warranty, products liability, negligence, and violation
of the building code.225
Relying on its prior decisions, the court stated that contract law was more
appropriate than tort law for recovering economic loss without any physical
injury or property damage.226 The court explained that the homeowners
suffered an ―economic disappointment‖ since the home failed to meet their
expectations.227 Noting that there are protections228 for purchasers of
homes, the court stated that the protections must be ―sufficient when
compared with the mischief that could be caused by allowing tort recovery
for purely economic losses.‖229 Therefore, the court applied the economic
loss rule even though the homeowners and Toppino were not in contractual
privity.230
B. Concerns of an Expansive Application of the Economic Loss Rule
According to Westinghouse, AFM, and Casa Clara, the Florida economic
loss rule provides that generally, principles of contract law, not tort law, are
the appropriate means to remedy claims of economic loss where there is no
physical injury or property damage.231 Following these three cases, the
Florida Supreme Court expressed concern that the economic loss rule had

222. Id. at 1245.
223. Id. The homeowners lacked contractual privity with Toppino since they purchased
their homes from developers who purchased the concrete from Toppino. See id. at 1248
(Barkett, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 1245 (majority opinion). Allegedly, the concrete contained too much salt,
which caused the steel in the concrete to rust and crack. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1247. The court further rejected the homeowners‘ suggestion that the
defective concrete caused property damage other than to the product itself. Id. The
homeowners contended that the products they purchased were the separate items of building
material, rather than the homes themselves. Id. The court disagreed, stating that the
homeowners bargained for and purchased the completed homes, not the separate materials
used to build those homes. Id. The concrete was an essential part of the finished product and
did not harm property other than the product itself. Id.
227. Id.
228. The court noted that protections for homebuyers include statutory warranties, the
warranty of habitability, the duty of sellers to disclose known defects, ability of purchasers to
inspect houses for defects, and the power to bargain over price. Id.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 1248.
231. See id. at 1247; AFM Corp. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla.
1987); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 902 (Fla.
1987).
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become overly expansive.232 For example, in Moransais v. Heathman233
the court observed that the economic loss rule was intended to limit actions
in the context of products liability.234
In addition, in Comptech
International, Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd.,235 the court noted the
confusion surrounding the application of the rule and stated that ―[h]ad the
courts adhered to these requirements (a product, the product damaging
itself, and economic losses), the confusion that has abounded in this area of
the law would have been minimized.‖236
The court went on to
acknowledge that its pronouncements on the economic loss rule had been
criticized.237 Finally, in Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v.
American Aviation, Inc.238 the court reiterated its concern with the over
expansion of the economic loss rule and how several justices supported
expressly limiting the economic loss rule to products liability cases.239
In Moransais, Comptech, and American Aviation, the Florida Supreme
Court expressed its concern with the application of the economic loss rule
and its desire to limit the rule in the products liability context. 240 However,
despite the court‘s explicit concern, it did not restrict the scope of the
economic loss rule.241
C. Returning the Economic Loss Rule to Its Roots
In 2013, the Florida Supreme Court took the ―final step‖ and held that the
economic loss rule applies exclusively in products liability cases.242 This
section examines the recent Tiara decision, the dissenting opinions, and
what it may mean for future litigants.

232. See Tiara Condo. Ass‘n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 406 (Fla.
2013) (―For some time . . . this Court has been concerned with what it perceived as an overexpansion of the economic loss rule.‖).
233. 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999).
234. Id. at 983 (―[T]he rule was primarily intended to limit actions in the product liability
context, and its application should generally be limited to those contexts or situations where
the policy considerations are substantially identical to those underlying the product liabilitytype analysis.‖).
235. 753 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 1999).
236. Id. at 1224.
237. Id. One Florida practitioner, Paul J. Schwiep, criticized the ―confoundingly
expanding legal doctrine‖ on a variety of bases and noted that ―judges, lawyers, and
commercial clients alike are all desperately struggling to define the parameters of the
economic loss doctrine.‖ Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak: The Monster
That Ate Commercial Torts, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1995, at 34.
238. 891 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2004).
239. Id. at 542.
240. See Tiara Condo. Ass‘n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 407 (Fla.
2013) (―[I]n Moransais, Comptech, and American Aviation, this Court clearly expressed its
desire to return the economic loss rule to its intended purpose—to limit actions in the
products liability context.‖).
241. See id. at 407 (―[W]e left intact a number of exceptions that continue the rule‘s
unprincipled expansion. We simply did not go far enough.‖).
242. Id. (―[W]e now take this final step and hold that the economic loss rule applies only
in the products liability context. We thus recede from our prior rulings to the extent that they
have applied the economic loss rule to cases other than products liability.‖).
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1. Workable and Wise Only in Products Liability Cases
Retreating from years of precedent that applied the economic loss rule to
a variety of contractual contexts, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that
the doctrine applies exclusively in the products liability context.243 The
case involved an insurance broker retained by Tiara Condominium
Association to obtain condominium insurance coverage.244 The broker
secured a policy for a loss limit of approximately $50 million.245 As a
result of two hurricanes, Tiara sustained significant losses as a result of the
damage.246 The insurance broker assured Tiara that the loss limit on the
insurance coverage was per occurrence (which means that since there were
two hurricanes, Tiara would be entitled to approximately $100 million,
instead of the aggregate amount of $50 million), and so Tiara underwent
costly remediation efforts.247 However, when Tiara requested payment
from the insurance company, it claimed that the loss limit was only $50
million in the aggregate and not per occurrence.248 Tiara and the insurance
company eventually settled for about $89 million.249 However, Tiara had
spent more than $100 million in its remediation efforts, and so it filed suit
against the insurance broker alleging breach of contract, negligent
misrepresentation, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.250
The Florida Supreme Court was faced with answering a certified
question from the Eleventh Circuit.251 The court rephrased the certified
question as: ―Does the economic loss rule bar an insured‘s suit against an
insurance broker where the parties are in contractual privity with one
another and the damages sought are solely for economic losses?‖252 Before
answering the question in the negative and categorically holding that the
economic loss rule is exclusively limited to products liability cases, the
court first reviewed the history of the doctrine.253
The court divided its discussion by focusing on two types of
circumstances where the economic loss rule had been applied: cases
involving contractual privity and products liability cases.254 The court
noted that the contractual privity form of the economic loss rule is designed
to preclude the parties from circumventing the bargain that they have made
243. Id.
244. Id. at 400.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. The Eleventh Circuit originally certified to the Florida Supreme Court the
following question: ―Does an insurance broker provide a ‗professional service‘ such that the
insurance broker is unable to successfully assert the economic loss rule as a bar to tort claims
seeking economic damages that arise from the contractual relationship between the insurance
broker and the insured?‖ Id.
253. Id. at 401–02.
254. Id. at 402–06.
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to allocate risks and losses specified in their contract by bringing a tort
claim for economic loss.255 Under the contractual privity version, a
plaintiff is barred from asserting tort actions to recover purely economic
losses where the damages sought in tort are the same as those for the breach
of contract.256 In other words, a tort action is not viable where a defendant
has not breached a duty separate and apart from the breach of contract.257
The reason for precluding a plaintiff from asserting tort actions in such
circumstances is because contract principles are ―generally more
appropriate for determining remedies for consequential damages that the
parties have, or could have, addressed in their contractual agreement.‖258
After reviewing the application of the economic loss rule in contractual
contexts, the majority opinion turned to the doctrine‘s origin and original
purpose.259 According to the court, since the economic loss rule originated
in products liability, the doctrine‘s original intent was to bar tort claims
solely in products liability cases.260 The majority opinion reiterated its
concern that the doctrine had created ―a legacy of unprincipled
expansion.‖261 The court noted how it first articulated its concern with the
expansion of the doctrine in Moransais, then in Comptech, and yet again
five years later in American Aviation.262 The court stated that it ―simply did
not go far enough‖ in those cases.263 Recognizing that the expansion of the
economic loss rule had become ―unwise and unworkable in practice,‖ the
court limited the doctrine‘s application exclusively to products liability
cases, receding from its use in the contractual privity context.264 Therefore,
the court answered the rephrased certified question in the negative,
rendering the economic loss rule inapplicable to bar Tiara‘s tort claims.265
2. The Dissenting Opinions: Workable and Wise in Products Liability
and Contractual Privity Cases
The two dissenting opinions questioned the use of the economic loss rule
solely in the products liability context.266 Justice Canady‘s dissent focused
on the court‘s continuous application of the doctrine in contractual privity

255. Id. at 402.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 403–07.
260. Id. at 407. The concurring opinion also explained that the original intent of the
economic loss rule applies only to products liability cases. Id. at 409 (Pariente, J.,
concurring) (stating that the economic loss rule is ―a doctrine that arose in the torts context to
serve a specific purpose—to curb potentially unbounded liability following the adoption of
strict products liability‖).
261. Id. at 406 (majority opinion).
262. Id. at 406–07.
263. Id. at 407.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 410 (Polston, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 411 (Canady, J., dissenting).
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contexts to prevent ―contract law from ‗drown[ing] in a sea of tort.‘‖267
The dissent noted that the underlying assumption of the economic loss rule
is to prevent parties to a contract from circumventing the allocation of risk
and losses specified in the contract by asserting an action to recover
economic loss in tort.268 According to Justice Canady‘s dissent, the
majority failed to explain why the economic loss rule is workable and wise
in the products liability context, but unworkable and unwise in the broader
context of contract-based relationships.269
According to then-Chief Justice Polston‘s dissent, the court should have
used its precedent to answer the original certified question from the
Eleventh Circuit in the negative.270 The initial certified question hinged on
whether insurance brokers provided a ―professional service.‖271 If
insurance brokers provided professional services, then the economic loss
rule could not be applied to bar Tiara‘s tort claims.272 Chief Justice Polston
reasoned that under Florida case law insurance brokers do not provide
professional services,273 and therefore, the defendant/insurance broker may
successfully assert the economic loss rule as a defense against tort
liability.274
3. Barred or Not Barred?
According to Justice Pariente‘s concurring opinion, even though the
contractual privity form of the economic loss rule provided an easy way to
bar tort claims intertwined with breach of contract claims, ―it is neither a
necessary nor a principled mechanism for doing so.‖275 If the defendant
does not owe the plaintiff any duty apart from that created by the contract,
the tort claim would fail under ―basic contractual principles.‖276 According
to the concurring opinion, therefore, the Tiara decision will not have a
substantial impact because it merely alters the means by which the court
will dismiss alleged tort claims that arise in a contractual setting.277 In
other words, instead of relying on the economic loss rule to dismiss tort

267. Id. at 413 (Canady, J., dissenting) (quoting E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986)).
268. Id. at 412.
269. Id. at 413.
270. Id. at 410 (Polston, C.J., dissenting).
271. See id.
272. Id. at 411.
273. Id. (reasoning that insurance agents, who are not considered ―professional for
purposes of the professional malpractice statute of limitations,‖ are like insurance brokers
and the definition of ―professional‖ requires at least a four-year college degree, which is not
necessary to become a licensed insurance broker).
274. See id. at 410–11.
275. Id. at 409 (Pariente, J., concurring).
276. Id. at 408–09.
277. Id. at 408 (―Our decision is neither a monumental upsetting of Florida law nor an
expansion of tort law at the expense of contract principles. To the contrary, the majority
merely clarifies that the economic loss rule was always intended to apply only to products
liability cases.‖).
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claims in contractual contexts, the court will employ ―basic contractual
principles.‖278
However, according to Chief Justice Polston‘s dissenting opinion, the
majority‘s elimination of the use of the doctrine when the parties are in
contractual privity ―greatly expand[s] tort claims and remedies available
without deference to contract claims.‖279 Moreover, according to Justice
Canady, by restricting the economic loss rule solely to the products liability
context, the court ―face[s] the prospect of every breach of contract claim
being accompanied by a tort claim.‖280 In other words, plaintiffs will
attempt to bolster their amount of recoverable damages by asserting tort
claims that ordinarily would have been barred under precedent prior to
Tiara.281
III. REDEFINING THE LIMIT OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE
As Part II has shown, Florida courts have struggled to define the limit of
the economic loss rule. As a way to overcome this struggle, the Florida
Supreme Court adopted a bright-line approach by limiting the scope of the
doctrine exclusively to the products liability context. Part III of this Note
argues that such a restriction of the doctrine is too narrow. This Note
contends that the economic loss rule is not just for products liability and
thus the limited scope of Florida‘s economic loss rule should be redefined
to include contractual privity cases. Specifically, the economic loss rule
should be applied in situations where sophisticated parties engage in armslength negotiations, bargaining for the allocation of risk and loss in their
contract. Part III.A argues that applying the economic loss rule pursuant to
Florida‘s products liability rule does not protect the boundary line between
278. Id. at 409 (―The majority‘s decision . . . merely explains that it is common law
principles of contract, rather than the economic loss rule, that [dismisses tort claims
interconnected with breach of contract claims].‖).
279. Id. at 411 (Polston, C.J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 414 (Canady, J., dissenting).
281. See id. at 410 (Polston, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Polston‘s dissent contends
that the majority‘s decision ―make[s] available a wide arsenal of tort claims previously
barred by the economic loss rule.‖ Id. at 410 n.10. Among the types of cases that Chief
Justice Polston cites as previously barred by the economic loss rule but now available as tort
claims include: Geico Casualty Co. v. Arce, 333 F. App‘x 396, 398 (11th Cir. 2009)
(applying Florida‘s economic loss rule to bar civil conspiracy and intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims arising out of a breach of an insurance policy); Mount Sinai
Medical Center of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., 188 F. App‘x 966, 969
(11th Cir. 2006) (applying Florida‘s economic loss rule to bar fraudulent misrepresentation
claims and holding that the hospital‘s remedy for alleged breach of search contract was for
breach of contract, not a tort action); Royal Surplus Lines Inc. v. Coachman Industries, Inc.,
184 F. App‘x 894, 902 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying Florida‘s economic loss rule to bar
insurer‘s tort actions which were based on insured‘s failure to provide information under the
terms of a contract); Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Avior Technologies, Inc., 990 So. 2d 532, 538
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (barring negligence claim against aircraft repair company and
holding plaintiffs were bound by the service agreement for the repairs and its limitation of
damages provision); Taylor v. Maness, 941 So. 2d 559, 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(barring recovery for fraud in the inducement and negligent misrepresentation claims arising
out of defendants alleged failure to perform under the contract). Tiara, 110 So. 3d 410 n.10
(Polston, C.J., dissenting).
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tort law and contract law because it fails to protect the bargain for the
allocation of economic loss made between sophisticated parties. Part III.B
offers an approach to determine the application of the economic loss rule
specifically where sophisticated parties bargain for the allocation of risk and
economic loss in their contract. In such a context, the economic loss rule
should always be applied, unless the contract says otherwise.
A. The Products Liability Rule Is Insufficient to Protect
the Boundary Line Between Tort Law and Contract Law
Products liability cases are a clear way to understand the boundary-line
justification: manufacturers should be held accountable under tort theories
where their products cause physical harm or property damage because tort
law is concerned with remedying such types of harm; on the other hand,
where the defective product causes harm in the form of pure economic loss,
manufacturers should not be held liable under tort law because such harm is
more appropriately remedied through contract or warranty law.282 Thus,
courts apply the economic loss rule to preclude plaintiffs from recovering
economic loss under a tort theory where the proper redress for such type of
harm is the province of contract law.283
However, the question still remains if (and to what extent) the doctrine
should be applied outside of the products liability context.284 To a great
extent, this question turns on the boundary-line justification.285
Specifically, what does ―tort law‖ mean when courts and legal authorities
assert that a principle justification for the economic loss rule is to protect
the boundary line between tort law and contract law?286 Therefore, how
broadly ―tort law‖ is defined is crucial to determine the proper scope of the
economic loss rule‘s application. A narrow reading of the boundary-line
justification posits that the economic loss rule protects the boundary line
between products liability law and contract law.287 Under such a reading,
the boundary-line justification does not protect all of tort law but rather a
particular subset, i.e., products liability.288 If this is the proper reading of
the boundary-line function, it is easy to see how the economic loss rule
should apply exclusively in products liability cases.289
On the other hand, if the boundary-line justification is defined broadly as
a means to protect the boundary line between tort law and contract law,
then it becomes more difficult to assert that the economic loss rule was
intended to apply exclusively in products liability cases.290 Even though
the economic loss rule originated in the context of products liability, the
282. See supra notes 129–37 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.A.2.a–b.
283. See supra notes 108–24 and accompanying text; see also Part I.A.4 (outlining the
benefits of recovering economic losses through tort law as opposed to contract law).
284. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
285. See supra Part I.B.1.
286. See supra Part I.B.1.
287. See supra notes 260–66 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 260–66 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 260–65 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 138–53, 267–74 and accompanying text.
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boundary-line justification should be interpreted so that the doctrine‘s scope
is broader.291 As articulated by the Colorado Supreme Court, underlying
the necessity for the economic loss rule is the ability for parties to
confidently allocate the costs and risks of economic losses in their
bargain.292 It should be irrelevant whether the case involves a defective
product because the focus should be to protect the bargain made between
the parties.293 Part of the boundary-line justification is to respect the
bargain for allocation of economic loss between parties.294 If a person
wishes to be protected from economic harm, he or she must bargain for
protection and pay the price of securing those benefits.295 In other words,
the economic loss rule encourages parties to confidently allocate the costs
and risks that may arise without fear that their efforts in the bargaining
process will later be negated.296 Moreover, the doctrine ensures respect for
the bargaining process by preventing parties from asserting tort theories in
their lawsuits to recoup economic losses, thereby voiding the careful
decisions made during negotiations.297
Although this Note acknowledges that application of the economic loss
rule in products liability is appropriate, it is inappropriate to restrict its
application exclusively to cases that involve a defective product because it
circumvents the allocation of economic loss that parties bargained for in
their contract.298 For example, suppose in negotiating terms for a contract
involving services (or any non-products-related matter), two corporations of
equal bargaining power negotiate for a specific remedy in the event one
party sustains economic loss. The remedy says that in the event the
purchaser of services suffers economic loss as a result of the seller‘s
negligently rendered services, the purchaser may not assert any tort claims
against the seller. Rather, the purchaser is limited to a $50,000 remedy.
Suppose the purchaser suffers economic loss in the amount of $100,000 as a
result of the seller‘s negligence in its performance of the contract. The
purchaser sues the seller for breach of contract and negligence. Even
though the parties specifically bargained for the allocation of economic
loss, under Florida‘s products liability rule the purchaser is not barred by
the economic loss rule from asserting its negligence claim.299
This, however, does not mean that the purchaser will recover the other
$50,000.300 This example is merely intended to show how Florida‘s
products liability rule weakens the practical force of the economic loss
291. See supra notes 256–60 and accompanying text; see also Town of Alma v. AZCO
Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Colo. 2000) (―Although originally born from products
liability law, the application of the economic loss rule is broader, because it serves to
maintain a distinction between contract and tort law.‖).
292. Town of Alma, 10 P.3d at 1262; see supra notes 144–46, 149 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 146–53, 267–69 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 146–53, 267–69 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 146–53 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 146–53 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 279–81 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 146–53, 268–69, 279–81 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 261–67, 281 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 275–78 and accompanying text.
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rule.301 In jurisdictions that follow Florida‘s lead, defendants may no
longer rely on the economic loss rule as a means to protect against tort
liability in non-products liability cases.302
In the example discussed above, this Note contends that, with respect to
sophisticated parties, such claims should always be barred by the economic
loss rule, unless the contract specified that such causes of action may be
asserted. The idea is that sophisticated parties can be assumed to engage in
perfect bargaining with equal bargaining power and levels of skill to carry
out the negotiations.303 If the corporation would like to be able to recover
economic loss based on a tort theory, the corporation must bargain for it as
a term of the contract.304 Thus, this Note posits that absolute deference to
the contract is the best way to respect the bargaining process for
sophisticated parties, a standard further explored in the next section.305
B. Redefining the Limit to Include Sophisticated Parties
in Contractual Privity
The economic loss rule‘s justification of preventing parties from
circumventing the allocation of economic loss is arguably most necessary in
situations where sophisticated parties to a contract negotiate in arms-length
transactions, bargaining for the allocation of risk and economic loss in their
contract.306 In such circumstances, Florida courts should take a different
approach by looking beyond the origins of the economic loss rule to the
terms of the contract. This approach requires absolute deference to the
contract, as outlined below.
If the contract specifies a remedy for economic loss and that no other
remedy may be pursued, the plaintiff should recover only under that
contractual remedy. If the contract is silent regarding the remedy for
economic loss, then courts should apply the economic loss rule in the event
that the plaintiff attempts to recoup economic loss under any type of tort
cause of action.307 Finally, if the defendant waives protection of the
economic loss rule as a condition to the contract, courts should not assert
the economic loss rule. In other words, in situations where the parties to a
contract are sophisticated players who bargain (or could have bargained) for
the allocation of economic loss, the economic loss rule should always
apply, unless the contract says otherwise.

301. See supra notes 279–81 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 266, 279–81 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text.
305. See infra Part III.B.
306. See supra notes 144–57 and accompanying text.
307. As stated in Part I.C, the contractual privity form of the economic loss rule often
does not apply where the defendant owes the plaintiff an independent duty separate from the
contract. See supra notes 158–74 and accompanying text. However, under the framework
advanced by this Note, the economic loss rule would apply in such instances. At the heart of
this approach is strict deference to the contract but only with respect to sophisticated parties
who negotiate in perfect or close to perfect bargaining conditions.
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In determining whether the economic loss rule should be invoked in the
context of contractual privity, the terms of the contract should be the most
important factor that courts take into consideration, especially where the
parties to a contract are sophisticated players on equal footing.308 Although
Florida courts previously considered the terms that parties to a contract
bargained for when applying the economic loss rule,309 this Note not only
contends that Florida courts should return to a contractual privity form of
the doctrine, but moreover, this Note is unique in that it argues for absolute
deference to the contract in instances where sophisticated parties bargain at
arm‘s length. In addition, where the plaintiff could have, but did not
actually bargain for a particular matter, courts should treat such an instance
as within the scope of the economic loss rule and refuse to entertain the
plaintiff‘s tort claims.310
Although an approach where absolute deference to the contract governs
application of the economic loss rule would place an extra burden on the
courts to inquire into the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant,
such an approach preserves the sanctity and integrity of the contract.311
Furthermore, such an approach is needed to reinforce the boundary line
between tort law and contract law so as to prevent sophisticated plaintiffs
from circumventing the allocation of loss bargained for in their contract.312
CONCLUSION
The economic loss rule can be a valuable tool to permit or bar plaintiffs
from recovering their economic losses under tort law. However, due to the
differing views and approaches to applying the doctrine, it can also be
confusing for courts and litigants to determine when the economic loss rule
should be applied. This Note has attempted to resolve the confusion of
applying the economic loss rule in a specific context: where sophisticated
parties to a contract bargained (or could have bargained) for the allocation
of risk and economic loss in their contract.
Despite its origins, the economic loss rule is not just for products
liability. Rather, the doctrine serves a broader purpose to protect the
boundary line between tort law and contract law. In circumstances where
sophisticated parties to a contract bargained (or could have bargained) for
the allocation of economic loss, the only relevant factor to determine
whether the economic loss rule should apply is the contract itself. Florida
courts should redefine the limit of the economic loss rule to include such
circumstances and should strongly consider applying the economic loss
rule, unless the contract says otherwise. For now, however, it is clear that
in Florida, and other jurisdictions that may potentially adopt such a narrow
application of the economic loss rule, defendants may no longer rely on the
doctrine to dismiss tort claims outside the realm of products liability.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

See supra notes 146–50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 170–74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 151–53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 144–53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 144–57, 267–69, 279–81 and accompanying text.

